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Abstract
We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum
games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large
in a natrual representation of the problem.
In zero-sum games, the notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the notion of a
Nash Equilibrium Korzhyk et al. (2011b). Finding these equilibrium concepts in zero-sum games
can be efficiently done when the players have polynomially many pure strategies or when (in
additional to some structural properties) a best-response oracle is available Ahmadinejad et al.
(2016); Dud´ık et al. (2017); Kalai and Vempala (2005). Despite such advancements in the case
of zero-sum games, little is known for general-sum games.
In light of the above, we examine the computational complexity of computing a Stackelberg
equilibrium in large general-sum games. We show that while there are natural large general-sum
games where the Stackelberg Equilibria can be computed efficiently if the Nash equilibrium in
its zero-sum form could be computed efficiently, in general, structural properties that allow for
efficient computation of Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games are not sufficient for computing
Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed significant interest in Stackelberg games and their equilibria. A Stack-
elberg game models an interaction between two players, a leader and a follower, where the leader’s
goal is to commit to a randomized strategy that yields the highest utility, given that the follower
responds by choosing an action that is best for itself. Such a pair of strategies is called a Stack-
elberg equilibrium (SE). The interest in these games is driven, in part, by their applications to
security (Tambe, 2011) and their adoption by major security agencies such as the US Coast Guard,
the Federal Air Marshals Service, and the Los Angeles Airport Police.
Standard approaches for finding a Stackelberg equilibrium, such as the Multiple LPs approach
of Conitzer and Sandholm (2006), run in time polynomial in the number of pure strategies of the
leader and follower. As Stackelberg games and their applications have become more prevalent,
they are increasingly used to model complex scenarios where one or both players’ strategy sets are
exponentially large in a natural representation of the problem, in which case existing approaches
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are not computationally feasible. In this work, we consider such “large” games and ask whether
there are computationally efficient algorithms for finding their Stackelberg equilibria.
Of course, such algorithms cannot exist without some assumptions on the problem structure.
Here, we review the common assumptions and approaches for computing minimax-optimal solutions
in large zero-sum games, where minimax strategies, Nash equilibria, and Stackelberg equilibria all
coincide. Computing these equilibrium concepts in 2-player zero-sum games has received significant
attention (Immorlica et al., 2011; Ahmadinejad et al., 2016; Behnezhad et al., 2016; Garg et al.,
2011; Xu, 2016; Wang and Shroff, 2017; Dud´ık et al., 2017; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945;
Hannan, 1957; Freund and Schapire, 1995; Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Conitzer and Sandholm,
2006). For large zero-sum games, two structural assumptions that have proven useful in computing
a Nash equilibrium are the ability to efficiently optimize a linear function over the strategy space of
each player (Ahmadinejad et al., 2016) and the ability to compute the best-response of each player
against a mixed strategy of the other combined with a decomposibility property of the action
set (Dud´ık et al., 2017).
In general-sum games, however, Stackelberg, Nash, and Minimiax equilibria diverge (See Ap-
pendix A for an illustration). In general-sum games the leader can benefit from committing to a
mixed strategy and obtain a more favorable Stackelberg equilibrium than any Nash equilibrium.
From the algorithmic perspective, a Stackelberg equilibrium in a general-sum game can be com-
puted efficiently when the game is small. That is, there are algorithms, such as the Multiple LPs
approach of Conitzer and Sandholm (2006), that run in time poly(|SL|, |SF|) where SL and SF are
the set of pure strategies of the leader and follower, respectively. While this method is an efficient
approach for computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in small games, it become computationally in-
efficient in many natural scenarios where the set of actions of the leader or follower is exponential
in a natural representation of the game. Examples of such settings include games inspired by ap-
plications to security, where either the actions of the leader or the follower represent sets of edges
in a graph. As opposed to the zero-sum case for which existence of certain structural properties
are known to lead to efficient computation of the equilibrium concepts, computation of Stackelberg
equilibrium in large general-sum games has remained mostly unexplored.
1.1 Our Results and Contributions
In light of the above, we examine the computational complexity of computing Stackelberg equilibria
in large general-sum games. Specifically, we consider two classes of general-sum games, both of
which demonstrate structural properties that under the zero-sum assumption would lead to efficient
algorithms for computing the minimax optimal strategies. For the first class of games, we give an
efficient algorithm for computing a Stackelberg Equilibrium. In the second class of games, we
show that even approximating the Stackelberg equilibrium is NP-Hard. This drives home the main
message of this work, that is while there are natural large general-sum games where the Stackelberg
Equilibria can be computed efficiently if the Nash equilibrium in its zero-sum form could be computed
efficiently, in general, structural properties that allow for efficient computation of Nash equilibrium
in zero-sum games are not sufficient for computing Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games.
In more details, the two classes of games we work with are as follow.
Incentive Games In Section 3, we introduce a class of games called Incentive Games. In
these games, the actions of the leader can be described as two-part actions, the first part of the
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action is an element of a set and the second part of the action is a set of incentives to the follower
for playing certain actions.
As a motivating example consider a taxation scenario. In this setting, a government agency
(e.g., IRS) takes the role of the leader and a taxpayer is the follower. A number of investments,
indicated by the set E, are available to the taxpayer. Each investment e has a return of ce to the
taxpayer. The taxpayer invests in a package of investments S ⊆ E that has the highest net payoff.
The government agency is interested in taxing these investments in order to maximize the tax
revenue. To do so, the agency allocates 1 unit of taxes1 between these investments. There are two
types of taxation mechanisms. First is taxing an individual investment e by some amount xe. The
second is to provide tax relief vS for a package of options the taxpayer has invested in. Examples of
the second type of taxation mechanism include United States federal residential renewable energy
tax credit that offers a tax break to individuals who have invested in home electric power storage,
e.g., batteries, and home-generated renewable energy, e.g., solar panels, but no tax break to those
who have invested in the former without the latter (U.S. Department of Energy, 2019; EnergySage,
2019). The tax revenue and the net payoff the taxpayer respectively receive from individual taxes
xe and combinatorial tax reliefs vS when the taxpayer invests in investments S are
∑
e∈S xe − vS
and
∑
e∈S(−xe + ce) + vS . It is not hard to see that these tax breaks play an essential role in the
design of tax systems. Not only they increase the total tax revenue obtainable by a tax system
(See Example 3.1 for an illustration) but they can also be used to incentivize the taxpayers to take
actions that are more beneficial to the government.
More generally, we consider Stackelberg games and we consider a family of sets § ⊆ {0, 1}E and
leader and follower element payoffs, Ce and ce, respectively, for all e ∈ E. A pure strategy of the
leader is to choose e ∈ E and a vector of incentives ~v ∈ [0, 1]|§|, such that ‖~v‖0 ∈ poly(|E|). 2 A
pure strategy of the follower is to choose one set S ∈ §. The payoff of the leader and follower are
defined, respectively, by
UL((e,~v), S) = 1e∈S − vS + Ce,
UF((e,~v), S) = −1e∈S + vS +
∑
e′∈S
ce′ ,
that is, the players receive non-zero-sum utilities from their individual choices, i.e., Ce and
∑
e∈S ce′ ,
and zero-sum utilities from choosing actions that intersect, i.e., ±1e∈S , and from the incentives
provided on the followers actions sets, i.e., ±vS .
We first note that when ce and Ce are set to 0 for all e ∈ E, this game is zero-sum and can be
efficiently solved when each player can compute its best-response to any choice of mixed strategy
of the other player, i.e., optimize a linear function over the strategy space of the other player using
existing results (Ahmadinejad et al., 2016; Dud´ık et al., 2017; Kalai and Vempala, 2005).
When ce and Ce are non-zero, we show that the leader can obtain a higher payoff equilibrium
if it could make additional commitments in the form of incentives for the follower, i.e., can play
non-zero ~v. An interesting aspect of this game is that it is derived from a simple Stackelberg
game model (where ~v = ~0) by adding zero-sum payoffs that only benefit the follower. Yet, the
leader’s payoff in the Stackelberg equilibrium of the new game is much higher than its payoff in the
1More generally instead of 1 unit of tax one can consider any other fixed upperbound for the total amount of
taxes used by the system. Note that any modern tax system is design with such an upperbound in mind to ensure
the welfare of society and avoid financial or social crises caused by excessive taxes.
2The sparsity requirement is such that the leader can communicate its strategy to the follower efficiently.
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original game.Moreover, as we show in Theorem 1 there is a polynomial time algorithm for finding
the Stackelberg equilibrium of such games when the leader can optimize a linear function over
the actions of the follower, which is a similar condition to the ones used for computing Stackelberg
equilibria in large zero-sum games (Ahmadinejad et al., 2016; Dud´ık et al., 2017; Kalai and Vempala,
2005).
Permuted Matching Game In Section 4, we introduce a non-zero-sum game called Permuted
Matching. In this game, there is a graph G = (V,E) and a permutation pi : E → E. The set of
pure strategies of the leader and follower is the set of all matchings in G. The goal of the leader
is to maximize the intersection of its matching with the pi-transformation of the matching of the
follower. On the other hand, the goal of the follower is to maximize the intersection of the two
matchings, with no regards to pi. More formally, for S ⊆ E we define pi(S) = {e ∈ S|pi(e)}. Then
the utility of the leader and follower are defined, respectively, by
UL(M1,M2) = |M1 ∩ pi(M2)| UF(M1,M2) = |M1 ∩M2|.
It is not hard to see that, in this game, the problem of finding a best response for a player
reduces to computing maximum weighted matching of G and can be solved in polynomial time.
This would have been sufficient for getting a polynomial time algorithm for finding a Stackelberg
equilibrium had the game been a zero-sum (Ahmadinejad et al., 2016; Dud´ık et al., 2017; Kalai and
Vempala, 2005). In a sharp contrast, however, we show that computing a Stackelberg equilibrium of
this general-sum game is APX-hard, even though, we can compute player’s best-response efficiently.
We obtain this hardness result via two reductions. First, we define the following computational
problem:
pi-transformation-identical-matching: Given a graphG and a mapping pi : E(G)→
E(G) over the edges of G, find a matching M of G that maximizes |M ∩ pi(M)|.
We next show that computing an approximate Stackelberg equilibrium of the Permuted Match-
ing game is at least as hard as computing an approximate solution for the pi-transformation-
identical-matching problem. The crux of the argument is that if in an instance of the pi-
transformation-identical-matching problem there exists a matching which is almost iden-
tical to its pi-transformation, then a Stackelberg equilibrium of the Permuted Matching game
is closely related to that matching. Thus, any solution for the Permuted Matching game can
be turned into a solution for pi-transformation-identical-matching with almost the same
quality. In the second step, we reduce the pi-transformation-identical-matching problem to
the Maximum 3D Matching problem, which is known to be APX-hard (Petrank, 1994).
We note that our results strengthen the existing hardness results of Letchford and Conitzer
(2010); Li et al. (2016) that showed that computing Stackelberg equilibrium is NP-hard3. Our
APX-hardness result shows that one cannot even approximate the Stackelberg equilibria of large
games within an arbitrary constant factor, even when best-response can be efficiently computed.
1.2 Related Work
There is an extensive body of work investigating the complexity of solving Security games, which
is a special case of computing Stackelberg equilibria (see e.g. Tambe (2011); Behnezhad et al.
3Interestingly, it is not hard to show that player best-response can also be computed efficiently in the games used
by Letchford and Conitzer (2010); Li et al. (2016), although this was not central to their results.
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(2017); Xu et al. (2014); Basilico et al. (2009); Letchford and Vorobeychik (2011); Xu (2016)).
zero-sum games Several algorithms have been proposed for finding the Stackelberg equilibria
of a special case of security games called the spatio-temporal security games (Behnezhad et al.,
2017; Xu et al., 2014). These games are zero-sum by definition, where Stackelberg equilibria, Nash
equilibria, and Minimax equilibria all coincide. In comparison, our work focuses on general-sum
games.
Smaller general-sum games Several works have introduced polynomial time algorithms for
computing Stackelberg equilibria in games where only one player’s strategy set is exponentially
large (Kiekintveld et al., 2009; Xu, 2016). A common approach used in this case is the Multiple
LPs approach of Conitzer and Sandholm (2006) that runs in poly(|SL|, |SF|). In this approach
one creates a separate Linear Program for every action y ∈ SF of the follower, where the variables
represent the probability assigned to the actions of the leader, the objective maximizes the expected
payoff of the leader, and the constraints assure that action y is the best-response of the follower.
This method can be implemented efficiently even when the leader’s strategy set is exponentially
large, e.g., when a separation oracle can be implemented efficiently. In comparison, our main
computational result focus on settings where both the leader and follower have exponentially many
strategies.
Existing hardness results Letchford and Conitzer (2010) studied the computational complexity
of extensive form games and proved a closely related hardness result.
They showed that computing Stackelberg equilibrium of a game is weakly NP-hard using a
reduction from Knapsack. Interestingly, one can efficiently compute player best-response in their
setting. In comparison, our hardness result improves over these results by showing that Stackelberg
equilibria are hard to approximate within arbitrary constant factor even when player best-response
can be computed efficiently.
A number of works have investigated the relationship between the Stackelberg equilibria and
Nash equilibria of security games and have shown that computing a Stackelberg equilibrium is at
least as hard as computing a Nash equilibrium of general-sum games. Korzhyk et al. (2011a) studied
a special class of general-sum Stackelberg Security games where any Stackelberg Equilibrium is also
a Nash equilibrium. This shows that computing Stackelberg equilibria is harder than computing
Nash equilibria. Li et al. (2016) studied Bayesian Stackelberg Games, where there is additional
uncertainty about the attacker and show that computing the Stackelberg equilibrium is hard, and
introduce an exponential time algorithm for computing the Nash equilibria. In comparison, our
work shows that Stackelberg equilibria are hard to approximate even when players best-response is
easy to compute. That is, we show a gap between the computational complexity of approximating
Stackelberg equilibrium of a general-sum game and that of its corresponding zero-sum variant.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we study Stackleberg equilibria of large games. Our emphesis is on two
player games and therefore we denote the players by L (leader) and F (follower). Let SL and SF
be the set of actions (pure strategies) of players L and F. For a pair of pure strategies x ∈ SL and
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y ∈ SF, we denote the payoffs of players L and F by UL(x, y) and UF(x, y), respectively. Similarly,
for a pair of mixed strategies X and Y we denote the payoffs by
UL(X,Y ) = Ex∼X,y∼Y [UL(x, y)]
UF(X,Y ) = Ex∼X,y∼Y [UF(x, y)].
In Stackelberg games, the leader commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy X and plays this
strategy. The follower then plays a best response against X, b(X), according to her payoff function.
Since the follower goes second its best-response is a deterministic action b(X) = maxy UF(X, y).
In case there is more than one best response for the follower, we assume she plays the one that
maximizes the payoff of the leader. A pair of strategies X and y are in Stackelberg equilibrium if
y is a best response of the follower against X and X maximizes the payoff of the leader, subject to
the follower playing a best response.
3 Incentive Games
In this section, we discuss a class of Stackelberg games where the leader has the ability to make
additional commitments in the form of additional incentives to the follower. Recall that a natural
scenario that can be addressed by this Stackelberg model is taxation. In this case the leader can
set taxes on individual investments but can also provide tax breaks on bundles of investments that
the tax payer has invested in. We first show how these additional combinatorial incentives can
improve the leader’s payoff significantly and then show polynomial time algorithms for computing
a Stackelberg equilibrium in this model.
Let us first recall the definition of Incentive Games. In this model, we consider a set of
elements E, a family of its subsets § ⊆ {0, 1}E and rewards Ce and ce for all e ∈ E. The set of
pure strategies of the leader is SL = E × [0, 1]|§|. That is, each action of the leader has two parts,
the first part is an element e ∈ E and the second part is a vector of incentives ~v ∈ [0, 1]|E|. We
assume that the leader is restricted to playing incentive vectors ‖~v‖0 ∈ poly(|E|). 4 The follower’s
strategy set is SF = §. The leader and follower payoffs are as follows.
UL((e,~v), S) = 1e∈S − vS + Ce, and UF((e,~v), S) = −1e∈S + vS +
∑
e′∈S
ce′ , (1)
that is, the players receive non-zero-sum utilities from their individual choices, i.e., Ce and∑
e∈S ce′ , and zero-sum utilities from choosing actions that intersect, i.e., ±1e∈S , and from the
incentives provided on the followers actions sets, i.e., ±vS . For ease of exposition and by the linearity
of the payoffs, we denote a mixed strategy of the leader by (~x, ~V ), where xe is the probability with
which the first part of the leader’s action is e and VS is the expected incentive provided on action S
in the second part of the leader’s action. Note that in this case, the expected utilities of the leader
and follower are
UL((~x, ~V ), S) =
∑
e∈S
xe − VS +
∑
e∈E
xeCe (2)
UF((~x, ~V ), S) =
∑
e∈S
(−xe + ce) + VS . (3)
4The sparsity requirement is such that the leader can communicate its strategy to the follower efficiently.
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Let us first consider a variation of Incentive Games where the leader cannot provide additional
incentives to the follower, i.e, SL = E × ~0. The only difference between these games is that
Incentive Games are amended by allowing zero-sum non-negative payments ~v that benefit the
follower solely. One might wonder if the commitment to make additional payments ~v to the follower
can ever be beneficial to the leader. This is exactly what we demonstrate in the next example.
That is, by allowing the leader to make additional zero-sum payoffs that only benefit the follower,
we can obtain Stackelberg equilibria that have much higher payoff to the leader.
Example 3.1. Consider a graph instance in Figure 1, E is the set of all edges, § is the set of all s-t
paths, there are no edge payoff to the leader, i.e., Ce = 0 for all e ∈ E, and the edge payoff to the
follower, ce, are the negative of the edges costs that are denoted below each edge. That is, this is an
instance where the follower is responding by choosing a shortest path with respect to the edge weights
that correspond to the probability with which the leader plays them. Note that, since there are many
s ta b
1 1 1
2.4
2.2
0.4 0.6
Figure 1: An example where additional commitment increases the leader’s payoff in the Stackelberg
equilibrium. The follower’s cost for each edge is denoted below the edge, i.e., −csa = −cab = −cbt =
1 and −cab = 2.2 and −cat = 2.4 for all the edges between s and b, and between a and t. The
mixed strategy of the leader is denoted in gray above the edges.
parallel edges ab and at, the leaders optimal strategy (with or without additional commitment) is only
supported on edges, sa, ab, and bt. It is not hard to see that without any additional commitment,
the Stackelberg equilibrium involves the leader playing edge sa with probability xsa = 0.4 and edge
bt with probability xbt = 0.6, and all other edges with probability xe = 0. Note that in such a mixed
strategy the follower chooses path a, b, t and the leader’s payoff is 0.6. On the other hand, when the
leader commits to providing additional incentive (or discount in the cost of a path) of vsabt = 0.2
on path s, a, b, t, the follower best responds by choosing path s, a, b, t and the leader’s payoff is 0.8.
Our main theorem in this section show that there is a polynomial time algorithm for finding
the Stackelberg equilibrium of this modified game.
Theorem 1. There is a polynomial time algorithm for finding a Stackelberg equilibrium if one can
solve the following problem in polynomial time: Given ~x and value W , return S ∈ §, such that∑
e∈S(−xe + ce) ≤ −W , or return “None” if no such S ∈ § exists.5
At a high level, we show that a Stackelberg equilibrium, (~x∗, ~V ∗), can be found by finding the
optimal solution (~x,~0) (with no additional incentives) that involves maximizing the followers payoff
of the best response, and then providing enough incentive on one of the follower’s actions. In
5An example of a game where this linear program can be solved efficiently is the shortest path game in Example 3.1.
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particular, we choose to provide incentive on the specific S ∈ § that constitutes the best response
of the follower to the mixed strategy (~0,~0).
For the first step of this proof, we consider the following LP, which can be efficiently solved by
the separation oracle given in Theorem 1,
max
~x,W
W +
∑
e∈E
xeCe
∀S ∈ §,
∑
e∈S
(−xe + ce) ≤ −W.
(4)
Let ~x∗,W ∗ be the solution to the above LP. Furthermore, let S∗ = arg maxS∈§
∑
e∈S ce, and consider
the incentive commitments V ∗S∗ = −W ∗ −
∑
e∈S∗(−xe + ce), and V ∗0 = 0 for all S 6= S∗. That is,
we provide enough incentive on set S∗ such that it becomes the best response for the follower.
To prove Theorem 1, we first prove a lower bound on the incentive needed to make an action
the best response of the follower.
Lemma 2. Let (~x′, ~V ′) be any mixed strategy of the leader and let S′ = b(~x′, ~V ′) be the corresponding
best response of the follower. Let W ′ = −maxS∈§
∑
e∈S(−x′e + ce). We have,
V ′S′ ≥ −W ′ −
∑
e∈S′
(−x′e + ce).
Proof. Let S′′ = arg maxS∈§
∑
e∈S(−x′e + ce) be one of the actions of the follower that corresponds
to value −W ′. Since all incentives are non-negative, we have that
UF((~x
′, ~V ′), S′′) =
∑
e∈S
(−xe + ce) + V ′S′′ ≥ −W ′.
Therefore, S′ is a best response to (~x′, ~V ′) only if∑
e∈S′
(−x′e + ce) + V ′S′ = UF((~x′, ~V ′), S′) ≥ UF((~x′, ~V ′), S′′) ≥ −W ′.
This completes the proof.
proof of Theorem 1. Let (~x∗,W ∗) be the solution to Equation 4. Let S∗ = arg maxS∈§
∑
e∈S ce,
and let V ∗S∗ = −W ∗−
∑
e∈S∗(−x∗e + ce), and V ∗S = 0 for all S 6= S∗. It is clear that b(~x∗, ~V ∗) = S∗.
Here, we show that (~x∗, ~V ∗) is indeed the optimal leader strategy.
For any leader strategy (~x′, ~V ′), let S′ = b(~x′, ~V ′) be the follower’s best response. Moreover, let
W ′ = −maxS∈§
∑
e∈S(−x′e + ce). We have
UL((~x
∗, ~V ∗), S∗) =
∑
e∈S∗
x∗e +
∑
e∈E
x∗eC
∗
e − V ∗S∗ (5)
=
∑
e∈S∗
x∗e +
∑
e∈E
x∗eC
∗
e +W
∗ +
∑
e∈S∗
(−x∗e + ce) (6)
=
∑
e∈E
x∗eC
∗
e +W
∗ +
∑
e∈S∗
ce (7)
8
≥
∑
e∈E
x′eC
′
e +W
′ +
∑
e∈S′
ce, (8)
where the second equation is by the definition of V ∗S∗) and the last inequality follows by the fact
that (~x′,W ′) form a valid solution for the LP in Equation 4, for which (~x∗,W ∗) is the optimal
solution and the fact that S∗ is chosen to maximize
∑
e∈S∗ ce.
Using Lemma 2 on the value of V ′S′ , we have
UL((~x
′, ~V ′), S′) =
∑
e∈S′
x′e +
∑
e∈E
x′eC
′
e − V ′S′ (9)
≤
∑
e∈S′
x′e +
∑
e∈E
x′eC
′
e +W
′ +
∑
e∈S′
(−x′e + ce) (10)
=
∑
e∈E
x′eC
′
e +W
′ +
∑
e∈S′
ce. (11)
Equations 8 and 11 complete the proof.
4 The Permuted Matching Game
In this section, we introduce a large but structured general-sum Stackelberg game, called Per-
muted Matching, and examine the computational complexity of computing its Stackelberg equi-
librium. We show two sets of results for this game. In Section 4.1, we show that this problem
is APX-hard. This implies that unlike zero-sum games, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium is com-
putationally hard even if best-response oracles are provided. In Section B, we give an efficient 112
approximation for this problem.
The Permuted Matching game is defined as follows. Consider the leader and follower, L and
F. Consider a multigraph G = (V,E) and a one-to-one mapping (permutation) pi : E → E. Note
that pi may take different values on parallel edges of a multi-graph. In the remainder of this section,
we refer to a multi-graph G as a graph. In Permuted Matching, the set of pure strategies of
both players is the set of all matchings in G. Given matchings ML and MF played by the leader
and follower, respectively, we define
UL(ML,MF) = |ML ∩ pi(MF)|, and UF(ML,MF) = |ML ∩MF|,
where for a set S ⊆ E, we define pi(S) = {e ∈ S|pi(e)}. Note that G and pi are fixed and known to
both players.
Let us highlight an important aspect of our hardness result in advance. As the next observation
shows, the strategy space of the players in Permuted Matching, though large, is very structured.
At a high level, the reward of each player is a linear function of the action of the other and each
player can efficiently optimize a linear function over the strategy space of the other player, for
example, each player can compute a best-response to a mixed strategy of the other.
Observation 1. There is a polynomial time algorithm such that for every vector ~w ∈ [0, 1]|E| finds
a strategy of the players whose corresponding representation vector ~v maximizes ~v · ~w.
Sketch. This problem reduces to computing a maximum weighted matching of a graph with edge
weights we for all e ∈ E, which can be performed efficiently Cormen (2009).
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In a zero-sum game, existence of such a structure leads to efficient algorithms for computing the
Nash or Stackelberg equilibria Ahmadinejad et al. (2016); Dud´ık et al. (2017); Kalai and Vempala
(2005). On the other hand, our APX-hardness result for the Permuted Matching game shows
that existence of this structure does not necessarily lead to efficient algorithms for computing
Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games. With this in mind, we present our hardness results
next.
4.1 Hardness of approximation
In this section, we show that it is impossible to approximate a Stackelberg equilibrium of the
Permuted Matching game in polynomial time within an arbitrarily small constant factor unless
P=NP.
Before we proceed to the proof, we define an auxiliary problem and show a hardness result
for this problem. Then, we take advantage of this hardness result and show that computing a
Stackelberg equilibrium of Permuted Matching is APX-hard. We call the intermediary problem
pi-transformation-identical-matching and define it as follows:
pi-transformation-identical-matching
Input: An unweighted undirected graph G =
(V,E),
and a permutation pi : E → E.
Output: A matching M of G that maximizes
|M ∩ pi(M)|.
For an instance I of pi-transformation-identical-matching, we denote by Opt(I) the opti-
mal solution to I and refer to the value of this solution by Val(I).
We show that pi-transformation-identical-matching has a hard gap at gap location 1.
That is, it is NP-hard to decide whether for a given graph G with n vertices and a function pi, the
solution of the pi-transformation-identical-matching problem is exactly equal to n/2 or at
most (1− )n/2 for some  > 0.
Lemma 3. There exists an  > 0 such that it is NP-hard to decide whether the solution of the
pi-transformation-identical-matching problem is exactly equal to n/2 or less than (1− )n/2
where n is the number of the vertices of the input graph.
We defer the proof of 3 to the end of this section and first show how this lemma can be used to
prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4. Computing a Stackelberg equilibrium of Permuted Matching is APX-hard.
Proof. More generally, we show that approximating a Stackelberg equilibrium of the Permuted
Matching game has a hard gap at gap location 1. This immediately implies a hardness of approxi-
mation. We show this by a reduction from the pi-transformation-identical-matching problem.
Suppose we are given an instance I = 〈G, pi〉 of the pi-transformation-identical-matching
problem and wish to decide for some ′ > 0, whether the solution of this problem achieves a value
that is exactly n/2 or is bounded above by (1 − ′)n/2 where n is the size of G. Based on I, we
construct an instance Cor(I) of the Permuted Matching game with the same graph G and per-
mutation pi and seek to find a Stackelberg equilibrium in this game. Note that by definition, Val(I)
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is equal to n/2 if and only if G contains a perfect matching that is identical to its pi-transformation.
Otherwise, Val(I) is at most (1−′)n/2 and thus any matching of G shares no more than (1−′)n/2
edges with its pi-transformation.
Since for small enough ′, it is NP-hard to distinguish the two cases (Lemma 3), we show that it
is NP-hard to approximate a Stackelberg equilibrium of the leader in Cor(I). If Val(I) = n/2, then
there exists a perfect matching in G that is identical to its pi-transformation. Thus, if both players
play this matching in Cor(I), they both get a payoff of n/2. Notice that n/2 is the maximum possible
payoff for any player in this game, therefore, such a strategy pair is a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Hence, in case Val(I) = n/2, the leader achieves a payoff of n/2 in a Stackelberg equilibrium of the
corresponding Permuted Matching game.
Now, suppose for  < ′/13 we have a 1−  approximation solution for Cor(I). If Val(I) = n/2,
then the payoff of the leader in an exact solution of Cor(I) is n/2 and therefore a 1− approximation
solution guarantees a payoff of at least n(1 − )/2 for the leader. Let the strategies of the leader
and follower be X and y in such a solution. Therefore, UL(X, y) ≥ n(1− )/2. Notice that X may
be a mixed strategy, but we can assume w.l.g that y is a pure strategy since there always exists a
best response for the follower which is pure. Also, let y∗ be the pi-transformation of strategy y. Let
for two matchings x and y, common(x, y) denote the number of edges that x and y have in common
and define dist(x, y) = |x|+ |y| − 2common(x, y). Recall that the payoff of the leader in this game
can be formulated as Ex∼X [common(x, y∗)]. Since this value is at least n(1− )/2 we have:
Ex∼X [common(x, y∗)] = UL(X, y) ≥ n(1− )/2
and thus
Ex∼X [dist(x, y∗)] = Ex∼X [|x|+ |y∗| − 2common(x, y∗)]
≤ Ex∼X [n− 2common(x, y∗)]
= n− 2Ex∼X [common(x, y∗)]
≤ n− 2n(1− )/2
= n.
(12)
Inequality (12) shows that y∗ is very similar (in expectation) to a random matching drawn from
strategy X. This intuitively implies that pure strategies of X should have a considerable amount
of edges in common. It follows from the definition that for three matchings x, y, and z we have
dist(x, z) ≤ dist(x, y) + dist(y, z). Therefore, we have
Ex∼X,x′∼X [dist(x, x′)] ≤ Ex∼X,x′∼X [dist(x, y∗) + dist(y∗, x′)]
= Ex∼X,x′∼X [dist(x, y∗) + dist(x′, y∗)]
= Ex∼X [dist(x, y∗)] + Ex′∼X [dist(x′, y∗)]
= 2Ex∼X [dist(x, y∗)]
≤ 2n
(13)
Recall that the payoff of the follower is determined by the number of edges his matching shares with
that of the leader. Moreover, since UL(X, y) ≥ n(1− )/2, this implies that Ex∼X [|x|] ≥ n(1− )/2.
What Inequality (13) implies is that if the follower plays X instead of y, he gets a payoff of at least
Ex∼X |x| − 2n ≥ (1− 5)n/2 against X. In other words UF(X,X) ≥ (1− 5)n/2. Since y is a best
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response of the follower against the leader’s strategy, we have UF(X, y) ≥ UF(X,X) ≥ (1− 5)n/2
and thus
Ex∼X [common(x, y)] = UF(X, y)
≥ UF(X,X)
= Ex∼X,x′∼X [common(x, x′)]
≥ (1− 5)n/2.
Hence
Ex∼X [dist(x, y)] = Ex∼X [|x|+ |y| − 2common(x, y)]
≤ Ex∼X [n− 2common(x, y)]
= n− 2Ex∼X [common(x, y)]
≤ n− 2(1− 5)n/2
≤ 5n.
(14)
Combining Inequalities (12) and (14) yields
dist(y, y∗) ≤ Ex∼X [dist(x, y)] + Ex∼X [dist(x, y∗)] ≤ 6n.
Therefore, we have common(y, y∗) ≥ |y∗|−6n and since |y∗| ≥ (1−)n/2 we have common(y, y∗) ≥
(1 − 13)n/2 > (1 − ′)n/2. If Val(I) 6= n/2, then Val(I) is bounded by (1 − ′)n/2. Therefore,
common(y, y∗) > (1− ′)n/2 holds if and only if Val(I) = n/2. Thus, an approximation solution for
Cor(I) within a factor (1−) > (1−′/13) can be used to decide if the solution of I is n/2 or bounded
by (1−′)n/2. This implies a hard gap for the pi-transformation-identical-matching problem
at gap location 1.
All that remains is to prove the statement of Lemma 3 and that completes the proof Theorem
4.
proof of Lemma 3. We show this lemma by a reduction from theMaximum 3D Matching problem.
In the Maximum 3D Matching problem, we are given a hypergraph G whose vertices are divided
into three parts A, B, and C. Every hyper-edge of G is a triple (a, b, c) of the vertices such that
a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and c ∈ C hold. A matching in this graph is a subset of the hyper-edges that do
not share any vertices. The goal of the problem is to find a matching with the maximum number
of hyper-edges. Petrank Petrank (1994) showed that the Maximum 3D Matching problem has
a hard gap at gap location 1.
We show via a reduction that pi-transformation-identical-matching is harder than the
Maximum 3D Matching problem. This implies a similar hardness result for the pi-transformation-
identical-matching problem. To this end, suppose we are given an instance I of the Maximum
3D Matching problem. Let the hyper-graph of this instance be G and its vertices lie in three
parts A, B, and C such that every hyper-edge of the graph contains a vertex of each part. We
construct a bipartite graph G′ and a function pi based on G as follows:
• G′ contains two independent parts X and Y , each of which contains an endpoint of every
edge of the graph.
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Figure 2: The figure on the left shows an instance I of the Maximum 3D Matching problem
and the figure on the right shows the corresponding instance Cor(I) of the pi-transformation-
identical-matching problem. Solid segments show the edges of the graphs and dashed segments
specify the corresponding pi-transformations of the edges.
• X = A′ ∪ A′′ where A′ and A′′ are two copies of A. That is, for every vertex a ∈ A, we put
two vertices a′ and a′′ in X (in A′ and A′′ respectively).
• Y = B′ ∪ C ′ where B′ is a copy of B and C ′ is a copy of C. That is, for every vertex b ∈ B
and c ∈ C we put a vertex b′ and c′ in Y (in part B′ and C ′, respectively).
• For every edge (a, b, c) of G, we put two edges (a′, b′) and (a′′, c′) in G′. Moreover, we set
pi((a′, b′)) = (a′′, c′) and pi((a′′, c′)) = (a′, b′). Note that, there may be multiple edges between
two vertices of multi-graph G with different pi values.
Now, we argue that for every 3-dimensional matching M of G, there exists a matching M ′ of
G′ such that |M ′ ∩ pi(M ′)| = 2|M | and viceversa. To this end, suppose M is a 3-dimensional
matching of G. Now, we set M ′ = {(a, b, c) ∈ E(G)|(a′, b′)} ∪ {(a, b, c) ∈ E(G)|(a′′, c′)}. Since
M is a matching, no two edges of M ′ share a vertex and thus M ′ is also a matching. Moreover,
for every edge in M ′, its pi transformation is also included in M ′ and therefore M ′ = pi(M ′).
Hence |M ′ ∩ pi(M ′)| = |M ′| = 2|M |. A similar argument shows that for any matching M ′ of G′
such that |M ′ ∩ pi(M ′)| = 2k, there exists a matching of size k in G. Therefore, the problem of
finding a maximum 3-dimensional matching of G reduces to finding a matching of G′ that shares the
maximum number of edges with its pi-transformation. Since the Maximum 3D Matching problem
has a hard gap at gap location 1, so does the pi-transformation-identical-matching problem.
Figure 2 describes the reduction mentioned above.
References
AmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Sina Dehghani, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghay, Brendan Lucier, Hamid
Mahini, and Saeed Seddighin. 2016. From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto
and Other Games. In Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
13
Nicola Basilico, Nicola Gatti, and Francesco Amigoni. 2009. Leader-follower strategies for robotic
patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies. In Proceedings of The 8th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 1. International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 57–64.
Soheil Behnezhad, Sina Dehghani, Mahsa Derakhshan, MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi, and Saeed
Seddighin. 2016. Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1612.04029 (2016).
Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, and Aleksandrs Slivkins.
2017. A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games. In Proceedings of
the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 697–714.
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. 2006. Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. In
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC). ACM, 82–90.
Thomas H Cormen. 2009. Introduction to algorithms. MIT press.
Miroslav Dud´ık, Nika Haghtalab, Haipeng Luo, Robert E Schapire, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Jen-
nifer Wortman Vaughan. 2017. Oracle-Efficient Online Learning and Auction Design. In Pro-
ceedings of the58thSymposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).
EnergySage. 2019. Using the solar investment tax credit for energy stor-
age. (2019). https://www.energysage.com/solar/solar-energy-storage/
energy-storage-tax-credits-incentives/
Yoav Freund and Robert E Schapire. 1995. A desicion-theoretic generalization of on-line learn-
ing and an application to boosting. In European conference on computational learning theory.
Springer, 23–37.
Jugal Garg, Albert Xin Jiang, and Ruta Mehta. 2011. Bilinear games: Polynomial time algo-
rithms for rank based subclasses. In International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics.
Springer, 399–407.
James Hannan. 1957. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. Contributions to the Theory
of Games 3 (1957), 97–139.
Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Brendan Lucier, Ankur Moitra, Andrew Postlewaite, and
Moshe Tennenholtz. 2011. Dueling algorithms. In Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM
symposium on Theory of computing. ACM, 215–224.
Adam Kalai and Santosh Vempala. 2005. Efficient algorithms for online decision problems. J.
Comput. System Sci. 71, 3 (2005), 291–307.
Christopher Kiekintveld, Manish Jain, Jason Tsai, James Pita, Fernando Ordo´n˜ez, and Milind
Tambe. 2009. Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games. In
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-
Volume 1. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 689–696.
14
Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, and Ronald Parr. 2011a. Security games with multiple attacker
resources. In IJCAI Proceedings-International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 22.
273.
Dmytro Korzhyk, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, and Milind Tambe.
2011b. Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability,
Equivalence, and Uniqueness. J. Artif. Intell. Res.(JAIR) 41 (2011), 297–327.
Joshua Letchford and Vincent Conitzer. 2010. Computing optimal strategies to commit to in
extensive-form games. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. ACM,
83–92.
Joshua Letchford and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 2011. Computing randomized security strategies in
networked domains. In Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence.
Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer, and Dmytro Korzhyk. 2016. Catcher-Evader Games. In Proceedings
of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2016, New
York, NY, USA, 9-15 July 2016. 329–337. http://www.ijcai.org/Abstract/16/054
Nick Littlestone and Manfred K Warmuth. 1994. The weighted majority algorithm. Information
and computation 108, 2 (1994), 212–261.
Erez Petrank. 1994. The hardness of approximation: Gap location. Computational Complexity 4,
2 (1994), 133–157.
Milind Tambe. 2011. Security and game theory: algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned.
Cambridge University Press.
U.S. Department of Energy. 2019. Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit. (2019). https:
//www.energy.gov/savings/residential-renewable-energy-tax-credit
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. 1945. Theory of games and economic behavior. Prince-
ton University Press Princeton, NJ.
Sinong Wang and Ness Shroff. 2017. Security Game with Non-additive Utilities and Multiple
Attacker Resources. arXiv preprint arXiv:1701.08644 (2017).
Haifeng Xu. 2016. The mysteries of security games: Equilibrium computation becomes combina-
torial algorithm design. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Compu-
tation. ACM, 497–514.
Haifeng Xu, Fei Fang, Albert Xin Jiang, Vincent Conitzer, Shaddin Dughmi, and Milind Tambe.
2014. Solving zero-sum security games in discretized spatio-temporal domains. In Twenty-Eighth
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
15
L R
U 1, 1 10, 0
D 0, 0 5, 1
Strategy Row player’s payoff
Stackelberg: (12 ,
1
2)× (0, 1) 7.5
Nash: (1, 0)× (1, 0) 1
Minimax: (1, 0)× (12 , 12) 5.5
Table 1: A general-sum game matrix where Nash, Minimax, and Stackelberg equilibria are different.
A Stackelberg, Nash, Minimiax Equilibria in General-Sum Games
In general-sum games, Stackelberg, Nash, and Minimiax equilibria diverge. Let us demonstrate this
by the game matrix in Figure 1. In the Stackelberg equilibrium, the row player (leader) commits
to mixed strategy (12 ,
1
2) and the column player (follower) responds by (0, 1), i.e., playing action R
deterministically. In this case, the leader gets utility 7.5. In the Nash equilibrium, however, both
players move simultaneously and play strategy (1, 0). In this case, the row player gets utility 1. In
the Minimax setting, each player maximizes its own utility assuming the worst-case.6 In this case,
the row player plays (1, 0) and the column player plays (12 ,
1
2), with the row player gaining utility
5.5.
B A 1/12Approximate Solution for The Permuted Matching Game
In Section 4.1, we showed that approximating a Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Permuted Match-
ing game within an arbitrarily small error is NP-hard. We complement this result by presenting a
polynomial time algorithm for computing a 1/12-approximately optimal solution. In other words,
our algorithm provides a strategy X for the leader that achieves at least a 1/12 fraction of the
payoff of a Stackelberg equilibrium against the best response of his opponent.
We first devise a greedy algorithm for finding two matchings x and x′ such that x shares as
many edges as possible with the pi-transformation of x′, i.e., maximizing |x ∩ pi(x′)|. To this end,
we begin with two empty matchings x and x′ and iteratively choose two edges e and e′ of the graph
such that pi(e′) = e, e is not adjacent7 to any edge of x, and e′ is not adjacent to any edge of x′.
We then update the matchings by adding e to x and e′ to x′.
Algorithm 1: Maximizing the number of edges shared between x and pi(x′)
Data: A graph G and a permutation pi over the edges of G.
Result: Two matchings x and x′.
1 x← ∅, x′ ← ∅;
2 while there exist edges e and e′ s.t.
• e = pi(e′)
• e does not share any vertices with x and e′ does not share any vertices with x′
3 do Add e to x and e′ to x′ ;
4 Return (x, x′);
6This is equivalent to each player playing their side of a Nash equilibrium when they perceive the game as a
zero-sum game.
7two edges are adjacent if they share a common vertex.
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We show that UL(x, x
′) for x, x′ computed by Algorithm 1 is at least 1/4 of the leader’s payoff
in a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Observation 2. Let x and x′ be the matchings determined by Algorithm 1. |x ∩ pi(x′)| is at least
1/4 fraction of the optimal payoff the leader gets in any Stackelberg Equilibria.
Proof. Recall that the payoff of the leader is the number of edges his matching has in common
with the pi-transformation of the follower’s matching. This value is always upper bounded by
maxy,y′ |y∩pi(y′)|. Assume to the contrary that a pair of matchings y, y′ exists such that |y∩pi(y′)| >
4|x ∩ pi(x′)|. Note that by the choices of Algorithm 1, we have |x| = |x′| = |x ∩ pi(x′)|. Moreover,
there are at least 4|x∩pi(x′)| edges in y′ whose pi-transformations appear in y. Notice that for every
edge e′ in x′, there are at most four such edges in y′ that either share an end-point with e′ or their
pi-transfrmations share an endpoint with pi(e′). Thus, there exists an edge e′ in y such that neither
e′ shares a vertex with the vertices of x′ nor pi(e′) shares an endpoint with the vertices of x. This
is a contradiction, as these edges could have been added to x and x′ by Algorithm 1. Therefore,
maxy,y′ |y ∩ pi(y′)| ≤ 4|x ∩ pi(x′)|. This completes the proof.
Let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small positive number and X be a strategy of the leader that plays
matching x with probability 1/3−  and matching x′ with probability 2/3 + . Moreover, let y be a
best response of the follower against X. Based on Observation 2, we show that UL(X, y) is at least
(1− 3)/12 fractional of the optimal payoff the leader can get in any SE.
Theorem 5. Let X and y be the strategies of the leader and the follower defined above. UL(X, y) is
at least (1−3)/12 fraction of the optimal payoff the leader achieves in any Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, y is a pure strategy. We first show that y contains all edges of
x′. Assume on the contrary that an edge e′ of x′ does not appear in y. If we add this edge to y
and remove the edges of y that share an endpoint with e′ then the payoff of the follower changes as
follows: Because X plays x′ with probability 2/3+ then e′ appears in his strategy with probability
2/3 +  and thus the payoff of the follower is increased by 2/3 + . Moreover, none of the crossing
edges of e′ with edges of y are in x′ and thus appear in the leader’s strategy with probability at
most 1/3 − . This incurs a loss of at most 2(1/3 − ) < 2/3 + . Thus, this change improves the
payoff of the follower which shows y is not a best response against X which is a contradiction.
Note that X plays x with probability 1/3 −  and y contains every edge of x′. Let U be the
maximum payoff of the leader in any Stackelberg equilibrium. We have
UL(X, y) ≥ (1/3− )UL(x, x′) = (1/3− )|x ∩ pi(x′)|
=
1
3
(1− 3)|x ∩ pi(x′)| ≥ 1
12
(1− 3)U,
where the last step holds by Observation 2.
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